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3Executive summary
Since the 2000s, the Pharmaceutical industry has been facing strong challenges: a constantly changing 
and increasingly complex regulatory environment, an erosion of margins caused by governmental 
pricing pressures and a decrease in Research & Development (R&D) productivity. This complex 
environment has hurt the industry’s bottom line, forcing incumbents and new players to reconsider 
their approach to the industry’s propelling engine: R&D.
Traditionally, innovation was driven by big pharmaceutical companies allocating an important 
amount of their sales on R&D spending. By developing new drugs in-house, these companies were 
managing to keep the control over these new drugs and treatments. These innovations were then 
protected by patents lasting for a few decades. Once the protection had expired, other players could 
enter the market by replicating the drug, driving its prices and hence, its profitability down by as 
much as 80%. 
In the last decades, the way innovation is being delivered has changed. Rather than big pharmaceutical 
firms developing new products, small biotechnological start-ups are responsible for most of the new 
discoveries. Their small size forces these players to specialize and focus all their R&D efforts on 
specific therapeutic areas. Additionally, these start-ups can attract human capital and talent, but lack 
financial muscle to exploit their findings. These conditions set the perfect framework for the increase 
of M&A activity with far more potential targets to buy. 
Building on this, a new business model has arisen in the industry: Growth Pharma. Among others, its 
most important characteristic is the way R&D is conducted. Instead of vast investments to develop 
drugs in-house, Growth Pharma companies tend to buy other biotech & pharma companies to acquire 
their drug development pipeline. In this way, rather than dealing with the uncertainty of developing 
new drugs and facing regulatory risks, these companies acquire other players with drugs in late-stage 
of development. 
The merger of Actavis and Allergan is considered as of 2015 the foremost example of Growth Pharma. 
In addition to being the fourth largest deal of all times in the Pharmaceutical industry, its 
characteristics make it a unique deal. The story started with an unsuccessful hostile takeover by 
Valeant Pharmaceuticals, a company which embraced Growth Pharma under the leadership of Michael 
Pearson. Some investors considered Valeant the new Berkshire Hathaway after it partnered in 2014 
with Pershing Square, a New York based hedge fund, to do a hostile takeover over Allergan. 
Actavis’ friendly takeover of Allergan granted the merged company access to the Top 10 companies 
by Enterprise Value within the pharmaceutical industry. Both companies followed different R&D 
models: Allergan’s closer to the traditional approach and Actavis opting for the Growth Pharma model. 
However, a combination of both companies seemed to bring the best of these two worlds. On one 
side, Allergan’s expertise in developing new drugs and block-buster patents such as BOTOX®. On 
the other side, Actavis’ best-in-class in pipeline success rate through a spotless record of effectively 
integrated acquisitions.
4Structure of the report
This Research Paper aims to provide an understanding of the recent dynamics in the Pharma Industry 
by looking at a particular M&A deal: the merger of Actavis and Allergan.
Section I provides a brief overview of the Pharmaceutical industry. It aims to explain the industry 
main segments, challenges, opportunities, M&A trends and business models. As Allergan focused on 
Branded drugs and Actavis on Generic drugs, Section I is deemed as relevant to understand the 
different business drivers to later on further understand the deal’s rationale.
Section II presents the case study that illustrates the acquisition of Allergan by Actavis, which took 
place by the end of 2014 and resulted in the combined entity currently called Allergan. This section 
is further structured in five chapters. The first chapter provides a description of the parties involved 
in the deal. Following this introduction, the second chapter discusses the strategic rationale of the 
deal. Deepening in the deal story, the third chapter describes the process by which what started as a 
hostile bid by Valeant for Allergan, ended up in a satisfactory binding offer from Actavis. After this 
contextualization, the section focuses in the financial aspects of the deal. Based on JPM estimates, 
the target’s enterprise value is computed to determine pre-merger expectations on the deal’s value 
creation (in EPS terms). To finish, section II closes with a post-merger analysis of the deal based on 
realised EPS figures. 
Section III aims to provide an outlook of the recent trends in the Pharmaceutical Industry, of which 
the case eventually serves as an illustration. It provides a deep-dive into Growth Pharma, as the new 
business model which is disrupting the industry, and its evolution since the 2000s.
5Section I: Introduction to the pharmaceutical industry
1. The pharma industry
1.1 Overview
Within the pharmaceutical industry, there are mainly two type of businesses: branded and generic 
drug companies. In a broad sense, the target (Allergan) belongs to the former whereas the acquirer 
(Actavis) to the latter. On the one hand, branded companies have higher margins, a temporary 
monopoly due to patent protection, larger sales, marketing and R&D expenses. On the other hand, 
generics companies produce off-patent formulations (drugs for which patent protection has already 
expired) and enjoy much lower margins. Therefore, they must generate higher sales volume to benefit 
from economies of scale.
1.2 Industry outlook
By 2014, global pharmaceutical revenues had reached the value of $1.23 trillion after continuously 
growing at a 5% CAGR over the past 5 years. Moreover, according to the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) (Industry, 2014), pharmaceutical sales were projected to increase and, eventually, to 
accelerate in growth to an average of 6.9% annually over 2014-18.
North America and Asia were expected to be the two main markets driving growth (Deloitte, 2015). 
Pharmaceutical spending in North America would be bolstered by rising employment, continued 
economic recovery, and the expansion of insurance coverage in the US. On the other hand, the roll-
out of public health programs in China was the main source of growth for the Asian market.
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Figure 1: Proportion of branded versus generic prescription drug revenues in the United States. (Statista, 2015)
6Figure 2: Pharmaceutical revenues in USD billion. (Deloitte, 2015)
The pharmaceutical sector’s landscape experienced important challenges throughout 2014-2015. 
Among the most important, the following: 
 Decline in R&D productivity accompanied by an increase in R&D costs
Total projected value of late-stage pipelines for the 12 largest pharmaceutical companies 
showed a decline from $1,369 billion to $913 billion in 2013 (Deloitte Centre for Health 
Solutions, 2013). However, while there had been a decline in pipeline volumes and success 
rates in early-phase drug development, the number of halted Phase III projects had also 
decreased suggesting the industry was leveraging its ability to “fail fast, and fail cheaply” 
(Deloitte, 2015). Actavis sought to leverage Allergan’s expertise in developing drugs in-house 
to increase its R&D productivity while controlling the costs.
 A constantly changing and complex regulatory environment
The healthcare sector is characterized by a complex and constantly evolving regulatory 
landscape, which is aimed to rule from patient health & safety to intellectual property 
protection. Adding to this complexity is the need to comply with all existing legislation which 
varies across countries. It requires a substantial coordination effort. There are important 
synergies to be considered between target and acquirer’s regulatory departments. Particularly, 
total number of FTEs (Full-Time Equivalent employee) assigned to regulatory tasks could 
be downsized.
 Margin erosion by pricing pressures
By enacting “pricing and reimbursement” legislation, governments in both developed and 
emerging markets were trying to bring prices down to minimize pharmaceutical spending. 
International diversification was deemed to become an important competitive edge to 
protect global margins from regional pricing decisions. Given the strong presence of 
7Allergan in the US and other countries, the merged entity could reach more than 100 
countries hence diversification was expected to be improved.
 Growing generic drug demand
The steady flow of patent expiration following the 2010-12 “Patent Cliff” continued to 
depress the revenues of branded drug companies. Additionally, pro-generic government 
policies encouraged doctors and pharmacist to substitute branded for generic products. 
However, existing patented products and niche treatments were still very profitable. In this 
sense, with the deal Actavis could secure some of Allergan’s bestselling treatments such as 
BOTOX®, which owned more than 50% of the treatment’s market share. 
 Scale to prosper
Historically, a slow-moving pace has characterised the healthcare industry because of strong 
regulatory and economic pressures. This adverse environment was driving industry 
consolidation. Size was increasing in importance to benefit from economies of scale to 
compete with low margins and to seek the level of growth demanded by investors. Overall 
transactions were skewing towards fewer, but bigger deals to build big pharmaceutical 
conglomerates. Actavis-Allergan merger is a perfect example of this race to the top. The 
merged entity would be top six pharmaceutical company by Enterprise Value as shown by 
Figure 13.
1.3 Industry consolidation
During recent years, the industry has witnessed an important increase in the number of M&A deals. 
This has impacted companies operating in generic and branded drug segments likewise. The main 
drivers are: 
 Accessing new branded products: nowadays most of innovation comes from small 
biotechnological companies as shown by Figure 3. Acquiring these firms allows big 
pharmaceutical companies to access new and cutting-edge branded products.
 Expanding into international markets: due to high regulatory burdens, pharmaceutical 
companies’ preferred method to expand internationally is by M&A.
 Reaching new therapeutic categories: some niche firms develop an expertise in a therapeutic 
category which might be untapped for bigger companies. Acquiring them is a safe approach 
to enter new segments as all regulatory burdens and clinical trials are already completed.
 Gaining economies of scale: due to the nature of the industry, with public sector having a 
high bargaining power and cutting down its healthcare budgets, pharmaceutical companies 
seek for consolidation to counteract by gaining size and efficiency.
Moreover, through M&A companies can also access talented human capital. For instance, acquirers 
get to hire the proven talent from small start-ups, the responsible for the discovery of this new 
specific branded-drug. 
8Figure 3: Number of new drugs approved by the Food & Drug US administration. (HBM Partners, 2016) 
US corporate tax policy has also served as a catalyser for M&A activity. Many US companies have 
performed tax inversions mergers, for the sole purpose of re-domiciling their headquarters to lower 
corporate tax rate countries (notably Ireland). However, the US government is taking measures to 
mitigate tax inversion operations. For instance, the last mega-deal within the pharmaceutical industry 
(Pfizer and Allergan, 2015) has been halted due to this new reform.
For target companies, the main motivation to be acquired by larger groups is obviously the 
consideration received. A typical situation is that of a small company with promising treatments in 
pre-approval stages, but lacking the capital and infrastructure needed to finish its development. Such 
companies can leverage the existing infrastructure (e.g. distribution channels, manufacturing facilities) 
and capital of larger players. It is the case for Bristol-Myers Squibb’s acquisition in 2015 of Flexus 
Biosciences, a biotech start-up which developed anti-cancer therapies. Flexus was less than two years 
old at the acquisition’s date and it had raised only $38 million after two funding rounds. Despite not 
having drug candidates yet in clinical trials stages, it was acquired for $1.25 billion.
1.4 Generic drugs
In 2013, 86% of US total prescriptions corresponded to generic drugs (Bloomberg, 2013). Firms 
selling generic drugs are not requested to conduct expensive and time-consuming clinical tests as 
branded drug firms do. Therefore, generic drugs firms spend considerably less capital in R&D. 
Moreover, sales and marketing expenses are lower than for the branded ones because the drug is 
already known by the market. Finally, generic drugs companies incur in higher expenditures in direct 
distribution, which allows them to have a better access to “shelf-space” in retailers and ultimately, 
higher revenues (David Reiffen, 2002).
This segment was mainly dominated by four players: Actavis, Mylan, Teva and Sandoz. As of 2013, 
these firms accounted for 32% of the industry revenues. After the top 6 players, the industry was 
9fragmented over 150 small and mid-cap companies (Statista, 2013). With a consolidation trend 
dominating the industry, it was hard for these companies to compete because they lacked scale and 
efficiency in comparison with the top players. Therefore, they were likely to be acquired during the 
following years.
Recent trends: the patent cliff and growth
Generic firms benefited from a “patent cliff” between 2010 and 2012. A “Patent cliff” is an industry 
term used to describe a period with a massively amount of patent expiration. For instance, during 
this period the patent of “Lipitor”, a cholesterol reducer developed by Pfizer, expired. Consequently, 
sales of “Lipitor” for Pfizer dropped dramatically by 42% during the first quarter of 2012 compared 
with the year-earlier period (Mullin, 2012). Although during 2013 no major patent was expected to 
expire, there were many best-selling chemicals set for expiration over 2019. This should intensify 
investments in biologic-specific manufacturing equipment, professional expertise and partnerships 
between biotech and generic firms. IBISWorld, a major market research company, expects the generic 
sector to generate $54 billion by 2019 with a future annualised growth of 6.8%. Another example of 
patent cliff concerning Allergan was the expiration of “Latisse” patent, an eyelash drug. In 2014, the 
US Court of Appeals in Washington ruled that it would let generic versions of “Latisse” enter the 
market.
Competitive forces
The generic industry main competitive factors are the following: price, brand awareness, first-mover 
advantage, delivery mechanisms, retail ties, dosage strategy, difficulty of formulation, niche offerings 
and relationships with pharmacists, physicians and other industry professions. 
Generic firms always try to be the “first-to-file” and the “first-to-market” when a concrete patent 
expires. The former means they target to be the first to file the ANDA (Abbreviated New Drug 
Application) for their generic offering. The latter means they aim to be the first company to place a 
generic alternative to the branded drug once the patent has expired. Usually, the “first-to-market” 
tends to achieve a critical penetration. Afterwards, other generic firms will bring to the market their 
own version of the drug as it happened to Pfizer in 2012 with “Lipitor”. Therefore, this drives down 
margins as competition increases (Burck, 2015). As a rule of thumb, the more generic firms 
succeeding in selling their drug version, the smaller are the revenues, the market share of each 
competitor and its margins.
Negative publicity or corporate scandals can damage business reputation causing a dramatic decrease 
in sales. In 2014, the general attorney claimed that Actavis’ plans to discontinue Namenda 
(Alzheimer’s medicine) and switch its patients to an extended-release version of the drug ahead were 
manipulative, unethical and illegal (CNBC, 2014). As a consequence, Actavis stock price went down 
more than 1% intra-day. 
Lastly, given the nature of generic drugs, price is a key decision-driver for consumers. For this reason, 
generic firms tend to cut down top and middle-line costs, often by leveraging economies of scale. 
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Competition from branded firms
Besides the natural competition among generic peers, the segment also faces competition from 
branded competitors. For instance, branded firms might seek to delay or prevent the approval of 
generic drugs by lobbying, changing the dosage strategy or treatments prior to the patent expiration. 
AstraZeneca sued FDA in 2016, the US regulator, to prevent generic versions of Crestor, an 
AstraZeneca cholesterol pill. The reasons given by AstraZeneca were controversial as were based 
upon a supposedly misleading labelling in Crestor-generics. Branded firms might pretend to create a 
new (although closely related) version of existing branded drugs following the end of patent-
protection. In other words, branded firms will launch “authorized generics” that will directly compete 
with the traditional generics (Pollack, 2013). In the past, branded firms used to engage in “pay-for-
delay” agreements with generic firms. This meant, branded firms would pay their generic 
counterparty to delay their market entrance. However, the Supreme Court of the US ruled against 
this practice on the ground of antitrust reasons (Supreme Court of the US, 2013). 
Barriers to entry
Despite having lower barriers to entry than the branded segment, generic firms still face some. 
Regulation is the main one. For instance, all pharmaceutical companies must comply with the 
Certified Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP), a compendium of rules regarding safety and 
quality. Moreover, they are subject to periodical inspections by supervising authorities. Finally, the 
industry is high capital intensive meaning that to enter the market, companies face high initial 
“Property, Plants and Equipment” fixed costs (Morton, 1998).
1.5 Branded drugs
Patented drugs as well as drug development pipelines are critical for branded firms to succeed. The 
entrance of generic competitors after a patent expiration can drive sales volume down by up to 90% 
for the previous patent owner (Robin Feldman, 2016). Therefore, keeping high R&D expenses is key 
to keep alive the pipeline. However, this expenditure does not guarantee successful drugs. In fact, 
just few developments become blockbuster drugs in the market.
Historically, R&D expenses were up to 20% of annual sales (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). 
However, there is a new trend in the industry, called Growth Pharma, which is lowering this figure. 
The fundamental idea behind Growth Pharma is that companies buy/merge other firms, which already 
own branded drugs in the market or have developments close to achieve the regulatory approval, to 
lower R&D expenses and optimise their capital allocation. Another trend consists on developing new 
biologic components which are harder to imitate for generic firms once the patent expires. 
Regarding competition dynamics, branded firms do not tend to compete against their peers. This is 
due to the specialisation that is arising in the industry. Most of the firms focus on a specific therapy 
of the industry developing drugs targeting this segment.  
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Recent trends: orphan drugs, revenue volatility
Orphan drugs are medicines which treat diseases affecting to less than 200,000 people. These drugs 
are characterised by lower sales volume and higher profit margins. Moreover, orphan drugs have 
some interesting features from a regulatory standpoint: an accelerated approval process, longer 
periods of market exclusivity and greater tax benefits (Aarti Sharma, 2010).
Revenue volatility is higher for branded firms. This can be explained due to the complexity of R&D, 
the FDA approval and patent expirations. Moreover, seasonal effects for some diseases (i.e., flu) can 
affect branded firms as they tend to be narrow-focused in few treatments. However, a proper 
portfolio diversification should be enough to hedge this effect.
 
Barriers to entry
Barriers to entry are much higher than for the generic segment. This is due to the high level of 
specialisation required for the workforce to develop R&D. Moreover, economies of scale are critical 
to compete in the market, hence small players are usually under threat of takeover. However, this 
should not necessarily be a bad situation for small players. An M&A deal can provide those 
companies with funds to develop their drugs, know-how and relationships with key stakeholders in 
the industry such as physicians or pharmaceuticals. Factors such as brand recognition, “monopoly” 
per therapy or regulatory environment hurdles are the segment’s main barriers to entry (Vernon, 
1992).
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Section II: The Actavis - Allergan merger
2. The companies
2.1  Actavis
The acquirer of the deal, Actavis plc (ACT), was an American pharmaceutical company 
headquartered in Dublin, Ireland. It engaged in the development, manufacturing, distribution, 
marketing and sale of generic, branded, biosimilar and OTC pharmaceuticals (over-the-counter 
drugs: medicines which do not require prescription from a healthcare professional). By the end of 
2014, prior to its merger with Allergan, the firm boasted the 2nd largest revenue base among generic 
drug firms and 15th largest in the overall pharmaceutical industry.
History
Founded in Illinois 1983 as Watson Pharmaceuticals by two pharmacist, Allen Chao and David Hsia, 
the company began as a small drug development enterprise focused on the development and 
manufacturing of generic pharmaceuticals. In 1993, Watson went public on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange and it then moved in 1997 to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, Actavis engaged in several strategic acquisitions aimed at gaining 
access to new products, new markets and, also, to a more favourable tax regime. Overall, since 2009, 
the company had acquired assets for a total amount of around $50 billion. The more relevant deals 
were the following (Table 1):
In 2012, Watson acquired for $5.5 billion in cash Actavis Group, a Swiss generic drug manufacturing 
company, which granted the company access to modified release and controlled release drugs. A few 
months later, in January, 2013, the company announced it would change its name to Actavis Inc.
In 2013, Actavis acquired Warner Chilcott in a stock-for-stock transaction valued at approximately 
$9.2 billion. To facilitate the acquisition, the firm created a new entity called Actavis Plc. Actavis Plc 
had its corporate headquarters in Ireland but retained its administrative headquarters in the US. This 
allowed the company a more favourable corporate tax rate (17% in Ireland vs 35% in the US).
In 2014, Actavis acquired Forest Laboratories in a cash and equity transaction for $31 billion to 
expand its drug portfolio with branded products in the US into central nervous system, 
cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, respiratory, and anti-infective areas.
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Table 1: Key mergers and acquisitions - Pharmaceutical industry (Market Realist, 2015)
Segments
Actavis had 3 revenue segments: Generic, Branded and ANDA Distribution. 
Actavis Pharma, the generic pharmaceutical division of Actavis, accounted for most of the company’s 
total sales (73% of sales in 2013). By 2014, management expected generic revenues to grow mainly 
due to two factors: high-growth from underdeveloped markets (primarily Latin America and 
Southeast Asia) with underserved demographics more likely to opt for affordable generic treatments; 
and the overall pro-generic government policies that encouraged doctors to prescribe generics to 
reduce overall healthcare government budget.
The remaining 27% of Actavis’ sales corresponded to Branded (13%) and ANDA Distribution 
(13.8%). 
Actavis’ Branded products division was management’s main focus for the incoming years, as to 
achieve diversification in revenue sources and growth in sales. By 2014, Actavis’s management 
focused on expanding its patented formulation portfolio to diversify revenue streams. Actavis had 
managed to grow its portfolio share in Branded products by +3.3pp since 2011, both through in-
house development, as well as, the acquisition of “mid-to-late development stage” pharmaceuticals 
Figure 4: Actavis revenues by segment in 2013 (SEC, 2013) 
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through licensing agreements and M&A. Actavis intended to continue growing its Branded division. 
Branded products provided substantially higher margins than their generic counterparts over the 
period of patent exclusivity, however they also required for high R&D expenditures (University of 
Oregon Investment Group, 2014).
Actavis ANDA division (14% of revenues in 2013) distributed generics from Actavis and other firms 
to pharmacies, hospitals and buying groups. Since 2011, the division had lost -3.1pp of share in 
Actavis’s sales portfolio.
Actavis remained very reliant on the US market despite having considerably accelerated its 
international expansion in the past years. By 2013, 71.3% of its product sales came from America 
(US, Canada and Latin America). However, this figure had decreased by 20 pp since 2011 (91.7% in 
2011) as mainly the European market, but also the MEAAP (Middle East, Africa, Australia, and Asia 
Pacific) markets grew.
Financial Analysis
Margin Analysis
Actavis Net Revenues experienced consistent growth throughout the five pre-merger years resulting 
on a 33% CAGR over 2009-13. This strong top line growth came mostly from a series of acquisitions. 
However, while revenues were growing, operational performance seemed to worsen persistently. 
Over 2011-13, margins decreased even going negative in 2013 (EBIT -4.3% and Net Income -8.6%). 
The consolidation of Actavis numerous acquisitions into its financial statements pollutes results and 
prevents a deeper analysis on the reasons behind this worsening operational performance.
Capital Investment Analysis
Actavis ran a capital-intensive business with its fixed assets accounting for a much larger portion of 
capital employed than working capital. From its Fixed Assets, the largest portion, between an 80 to 
90%, corresponded to goodwill resulting from acquisitions and to intangible assets, such as patents. 
This was in line with the characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry and of the company’s extensive 
M&A activity. 
Figure 5: Actavis's key figures (SEC, 2013) 
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All of Actavis’ investment indicators, pointed to an expansion strategy. Actavis was growing: in Capex 
(Overall Net PPE>Depreciation), in R&D investment (growing R&D expenditure in absolute value 
and as % of revenues, though below Patent Amortization) and also inorganically, through the 
acquisition of businesses (Acquisition of Business CF>0).
In thousands $ 2011 2012 2013
Working Capital 690,500 1,017,300 1,342,900
Fixed Assets (Tangible & Intangible incl Goodwill) 4,128,600 10,223,800 18,291,200
     Goodwill and Intangibles as % of FA 80% 84% 90%
= Capital Employed 4,819,100 11,241,100 19,634,100
   % Change 2% 133% 75%
Depreciation (Tangible Assets) 93,600 97,500 202,000
Net PPE CF (-Purchase + Sale) -120,000 -129,500 -170,800
Amortization (Intangible Assets) 354,300 481,100 842,700
R&D Expense -295,400 -401,800 -616,900
Acquisition of Business CF -575,100 -5,742,800 -15,100
Investment Strategy
Table 2: Actavis's investment strategy (SEC, 2013)
Financing Analysis
Actavis’ extensive M&A activity and the following business integration hinders a deeper analysis on 
its financial position. 
Considering its Cash Flow Statement, the continuous positive and growing Cash Flow from 
Operations (CFO) is a good sign indicating the company’s capabilities to generate cash from its core 
business. Regarding the Cash Flow from Investments (CFI), its negative value is explained by the 
company’s expansion strategy which requires for a continuous acquisition of assets. Finally, Cash 
Flow from Financing (CFF) is quite volatile and overall negative, except for 2009 and 2012 periods 
which correspond with M&A deals that involved debt financing.
Regarding its Gearing and ND/EBITDA ratio, both outline a highly-levered capital structure. On 
the 3-years prior to the merger, Actavis ND/EBITDA ratio skyrocketed to very high values 6-7x due 
to an overall increase in ND that was not matched with EBITDA because of falling margins.
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In thousands $ 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
After-tax Kd 2.3% 11.0% 9.9% 1.9% 2.7%
Net Debt 1,242,800 751,100 808,800 6,105,300 8,720,500
EBITDA 585,900 619,700 1,060,400 1,050,200 1,350,200
ND/EBITDA Ratio 2.1x 1.2x 0.8x 5.8x 6.5x
EBIT 396,600 307,500 544,300 460,400 -370,700
Net Interest 29,200 82,500 79,700 114,200 235,000
Gearing Ratio 13.6x 3.7x 6.8x 4.0x -1.6x
In thousands $ 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) 376,800 571,000 632,000 665,800 1,213,500
Cash Flow from Investments (CFI) -1,036,100 -74,100 -719,000 -5,749,000 -275,300
Cash Flow from Financing (CFF) 353,100 -411,300 16,400 5,189,600 -867,300
Increase (Decrease) in Cash and Equivalents -306,200 85,600 -70,600 106,400 70,900
Net Debt (Cash) 1,242,800 751,100 808,800 6,105,300 8,720,500
Gearing and ND/EBITDA Ratio
Cash Flow
Table 3: Actavis's cash flows and debt ratios (SEC, 2013)
Returns Analysis
Actavis’ Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and Return on Equity (ROE) follow a negative trend, 
mainly driven by a decrease in operational efficiency and very low bottom-line margins. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EBIT After tax 256,000 240,200 347,400 313,600 -483,400
Capital Employed 5,032,400 4,741,600 4,819,100 11,241,100 19,634,100
ROCE 5.1% 5.1% 7.2% 2.8% -2.5%
Net Income 222,000 184,400 260,900 97,300 -750,400
SH Equity 3,023,100 3,282,600 3,562,500 3,856,400 9,537,100
ROE 7.3% 5.6% 7.3% 2.5% -7.9%
DuPont Analysis
Operating efficiency 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.09
Asset turnover 0.47 0.61 0.68 0.42 0.38
Equity multiplier 1.98 1.78 1.88 3.66 2.38
ROE 7.3% 5.6% 7.3% 2.5% -7.9%
Return Analysis
Table 4: Actavis's return analysis (SEC, 2013)
2.2 Allergan
Allergan Inc., was an American pharmaceutical group headquartered in California, US. Operating 
across the US, Europe, Asia Pacific and South America, it focused mainly on branded drugs, 
biologicals and medical devices. While BOTOX® was their best-known drug, Allergan also held a 
portfolio of ophthalmic, urological, dermatological and neurological drugs. As opposed to Actavis, 
Allergan lacked presence in generics.
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History
Allergan Pharmaceuticals, Inc, was founded by pharmacist Gavin S. Herbert in 1950 in Delaware, 
US. Allergan focused on the discovery and development of new medicine for specially markets, such 
as eye care products, and owned the well-renown BOTOX®, its flagship product.
In March 1, 2013, Allergan acquired MAP Pharmaceutical, Inc. for $1 billion a biopharmaceutical 
company focused on developing new drugs in neurology, mainly researching in the treatment of 
migraine. 
Segments
Allergan had two product divisions: Speciality Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices (mainly Breast 
and Facial Aesthetics).
Figure 6: 2013 Allergan's revenues (SEC, 2013)
The Speciality Pharmaceutical division (85% of sales in 2013) had historically accounted for most of 
Allergan’s sales. Eye Care, BOTOX®/Neuromodulators and Skin Care were the main medical fields 
of its drug portfolio.
The Medical Devices segment (13.6% of sales in 2013) produced a broad range of medical devices, 
including: breast implants and tissue expanders, as well as, facial aesthetics products.
The US was Allergan’s most important market (62% of its Product Net Sales) ahead of Europe (20%).
Financial Analysis
Margin Analysis
Allergan’s Net Revenues experienced consistent growth throughout the five pre-merger years 
resulting on 8.8% CAGR over 2009-13. Allergan’s growth was mainly organic and resulted in 
healthier margins. As of 2013, EBITDA margin was of 33% and main cost items corresponded to: 
Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) of 10%, R&D Expenses of 17% and Selling, General and 
Administrative (SG&A) costs of 40% of revenues. Finally, the 16% Net Income margin reflected the 
overall healthy condition of Allergan’s P&L.
84.7%
13.6%
1.9%
Allergan Inc - 2013 Revenues by Segment
Specialty Pharmaceuticals
Medical Devices
Other Revenues
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Figure 7: Allergan's key figures (SEC, 2013)
Capital Investment Analysis
Allergan’s asset structure was also that of a capital-intensive business, common given the industry 
particularities. As for Actavis, the largest portion of its Fixed Assets between 75 to 80% corresponded 
to Goodwill and to Intangible assets, such as Patents.
Allergan’s investment focus was mainly in R&D, its expenditure was larger than the total amount 
dedicated to Capex and Business Acquisitions (the latter, an indicator of inorganic growth). This 
finding is in line with Allergan’s strategy to grow organically through in-house innovation. 
Financing Analysis
Allergan’s financial position was very strong as shown by the large amount of Excess Cash held on 
its Balance Sheet ($1.50 billion in 2013). When looking at the company’s Gearing Ratio (EBIT/Net 
Interest), the previous conclusion is reinforced. With its EBIT being more than 20x larger than its 
Net Interest, the company showed far sufficient capacity to meet its debt interest obligations.
In thousands $ 2011 2012 2013
Working Capital 591,200 450,000 481,900
Fixed Assets (Tangible & Intangible incl Goodwill) 4,460,300 4,720,500 5,254,600
     Goodwill and Intangibles as % of FA 74% 74% 77%
= Capital Employed 5,051,500 5,170,500 5,736,500
   % Change 7% 2% 11%
Depreciation (Tangible Assets) 167,300 166,400 137,900
Net PPE CF (-Purchase + Sale) -117,400 -141,500 -171,400
Amortization (Intangible Assets) 86,100 90,200 116,700
R&D Expense -902,800 -989,600 -1,042,300
Acquisition of Business CF -101,400 -349,200 -849,400
Investment Strategy
Table 5: Allergan's investment strategy (SEC, 2013)
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Considering its Cash Flow Statement, the continuous positive and growing CFO is a good sign 
indicating the company’s capability to generate cash from its core business. Regarding the CFI, its 
negative value indicates that Allergan is currently in a growth stage requiring for investment in assets. 
Finally, CFF is quite volatile with some periods like that of 2013 characterized by debt issuance, 
whereas others like 2011 with large debt repayments.
 
Returns Analysis
As of 2013, Allergan’s ROE was of 15.3%. On the past five years, its behaviour had been slightly 
volatile despite being positive and overall growing. The main contributor of this positive evolution 
was ROCE. Throughout the past three years, ROCE consistently increased to reach 26.3% by 2013.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EBIT After tax 762,216 203,448 1,146,264 1,335,768 1,511,160
Capital Employed 4,796,000 4,710,000 5,051,500 5,170,500 5,736,500
ROCE 15.9% 4.3% 22.7% 25.8% 26.3%
Net Income 621,300 600 934,500 1,098,800 985,100
SH Equity 4,822,800 4,757,700 5,309,600 5,837,100 6,469,500
ROE 12.9% 0.0% 17.6% 18.8% 15.2%
DuPont Analysis
Operating efficiency 0.14 0.00 0.17 0.19 0.16
Asset turnover 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.62 0.59
Equity multiplier 1.56 1.75 1.60 1.57 1.63
ROE 12.9% 0.0% 17.6% 18.8% 15.2%
Return Analysis
Table 7: Allergan's return analysis (SEC, 2013)
In thousands $ 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
After-tax Kd -16.0% -13.3% -6.6% -4.1% -4.6%
Net Debt -437,700 -535,500 -986,700 -1,401,200 -1,495,200
EBITDA 1,190,100 884,800 1,642,200 1,892,200 2,075,300
ND/EBITDA Ratio -0.4x -0.6x -0.6x -0.7x -0.7x
EBIT 907,400 242,200 1,364,600 1,590,200 1,799,000
Net Interest 69,900 71,400 64,900 56,900 68,200
Gearing Ratio 13.0x 3.4x 21.0x 27.9x 26.4x
In thousands $ 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) 1,113,300 463,900 1,081,900 1,599,900 1,695,400
Cash Flow from Investments (CFI) -98,700 -977,200 340,800 -589,300 -1,375,300
Cash Flow from Financing (CFF) -181,500 563,000 -1,002,300 -717,500 28,200
Increase (Decrease) in Cash and Equivalents 833,100 49,700 420,400 293,100 348,300
Net Debt (Cash) -437,700 -535,500 -986,700 -1,401,200 -1,495,200
Gearing and ND/EBITDA Ratio
Cash Flow
Table 6: Allergan's cash flows and debt ratios (SEC, 2013)
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3. Acquisition’s Strategic Rationale
This section aims to explain the strategic rationale behind Actavis-Allergan merger. First, it introduces 
main dynamics driving M&A in the pharmaceutical industry. Second, it explains Actavis’s view on 
Allergan’s business and how the target’s strategy fits in Actavis long-run vision.
3.1 M&A Pharmaceutical trends
2014-2015 was a period of high deal-making activity in the Pharmaceutical Industry, totalling $218 
billion in 2014 and $407 billion in 2015 in combined M&A, financing and partnering activity (Figure 
8). The last time the industry had seen such a level of activity was in 2009, a year characterized by 
industry consolidation and mega-deals driven by large companies (e.g., Pfizer/Wyeth and 
Merck/Shering Plough). 
Drivers of 2014-2015 M&A Activity
Both in 2014 and 2015, M&A deals accounted for a large stake of the overall deal-making activity: 
45% in 2014 and 68% in 2015. Main reasons for this M&A wave are the following (Neel Patel, 2015):
 A market rewarding companies that engage in M&A
In 2014, top 10 M&A buyers had a 64% greater return than the overall large-cap 
pharmaceutical index (DRG, Arca Pharmaceutical Index) from 2012 to May 2015     
Figure 9).
Figure 8: Deal activity in Life Sciences (BCIQ DealMakers, 2015)
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    Figure 9: M&A Top 10 deals. (BCIQ DealMakers, 2015)
 Willingness to reduce Payer Power
Payer Power from individuals and governments could also be behind a consolidation trend 
on the manufacturer side. Rebates as % of gross US sales increased from 20% to 32% in the 
2007-2014 period, which seemed to indicate an increase in the negotiation power from the 
payer side (Figure 10). Consolidation in the manufacturer side could be an attempt to 
increase pharmaceutical companies’ market power.
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 Tax Inversion
Despite existing regulation seeking to block tax-centric M&A deals, the incentive to merge 
to reduce tax base still existed. Typically, US pharmaceutical companies generate significant 
revenue abroad, revenue which they cannot bring back to the US without paying an 
important tax bill. Moving tax domicile unlocks that cash for dividends, acquisitions, 
buybacks, etc. Until 2015 pharmaceutical companies had managed to reduce their tax bill by 
up to 56% after M&A deals. However, in early 2016 new regulation managed to stop a few 
tax-centric deals including Pfizer’s attempt to engineer a $160 billion reverse merger with 
Allergan or AbbVie’s attempt to buy Ireland’s Shire for $52 billion. Even though this 
behaviour is not exclusive of the pharmaceutical industry, they particularly caught the US 
Congress attention due to the size and importance of the big pharmaceutical corporations 
trying to avoid US-taxes. Consequently, all sorts of tax-minimization strategies and deals are 
in upheaval since early 2016.
M&A Supply and Demand by Development Stage
Throughout the drug-development value chain, Preclinical and Phase III are the two stages capturing 
the largest interest towards M&A activity (Figure 11). Moreover, both phases are the ones showing 
larger relative imbalance between supply and demand and hence, are more likely to represent 
unrealistic value expectations. However, whereas Preclinical market dynamics are ruled by Buyer’s 
intentions (higher offer than demand), Phase III market is driven by Seller’s intentions.
The above findings don’t come as a surprise. Buyer’s interest in Phase III is explained by the low-
risk of this assets, which leads to buyers willing to pay a premium to shed that risk and go for a safe 
bet. Buyer’s relative high interest in Preclinical assets is, however, slightly more intriguing. Still, there 
are two likely explanations that could justify it. On one hand, products at this stage can be acquired 
less expensively, as they still come with low success-rate probabilities. On the other hand, buyers 
need to fight early to get into hot areas and benefit from the first-mover advantage.
Figure 10: Rebates as % of Gross Us Pharmaceutical Sales. (Credit Suisse, 2014)
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Figure 11: Buyers & Sellers interest for each development phase. (Campbell Alliance, 2015)
3.2 Management view
Brent Saunders, Actavis CEO, expertise in inorganic growth through M&A is key to understand the 
development of Actavis-Allergan merge. Besides developing new treatments and increasing its 
operational efficiency, Actavis’s CEO convinced the board that Allergan’s strategy and characteristics 
were aligned with those of Actavis. Moreover, a proven track record of successful integrations from 
previous acquisitions was a key decision driver to bid for Allergan. (Figure 12)
Figure 12: Past successful integrations. (Actavis, 2014)
Actavis-Allergan merge was driven by some of the trends described in the previous section. Actavis 
would benefit from the existing brand-awareness of Allergan’s blockbusters, such as BOTOX®. 
Moreover, the fact that Valeant also bid for Allergan is an example of the high buyer interest that 
arises when the target owns successful drugs or Phase III promising developments. (Figure 15)
Another characteristic observed is the target’s suitability to undertake a Tax Inversion process. 
Thanks to the merger, Allergan could decrease its tax rate from 26% to 15%, by moving its 
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administrative centre from the US to Ireland (Actavis tax domicile). In this way, bottom line was 
boosted without the need of implementing any operational improvement.
Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry is very capital intensive with high fixed and low variable costs. 
While they spend an important fraction of the budget in research and development, the actual cost 
of manufacturing a treatment is negligible. Consequently, Actavis-Allergan merger benefits from the 
actual nature of the industry. Being the top 6 firm by Enterprise Value (Figure 13) enables them to 
join efforts in R&D and to leverage existing know-how to become more efficient.
Regarding portfolio management and distribution channels, Actavis sought to start competing in the 
branded-segment to complement its successful generic arm. Allergan had a world-class sales team 
capable of managing a portfolio with six blockbuster’s drugs (Figure 14) yielding in 2015 more than 
$15 billion in sales. Moreover, Allergan operated in large, promising and growing therapeutic 
categories:
Figure 14: Actavis blockbusters’ franchises. (Actavis, 2014)
Figure 13: Pharmaceutical companies by Enterprise Value. (Actavis, 2014) 
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Geographical expansion was a top priority for Actavis’s CEO. With the acquisition, the company 
would operate in more than 100 countries in key markets such as Canada, Europe, Southeast Asia, 
Latin America, China and India. Additionally, Allergan’s franchises were leading drugs and 
treatments, including world-recognised brands like BOTOX®.
The combined firm would commit to spend $1.7 billion during 2015 in R&D to develop and expand 
its pipeline (Figure 15). Moreover, it would have more than 20 drugs in late-stage of development 
within its core therapeutic areas. Another source of growth would be in ANDA distribution, where 
the combined firm could benefit from having more than 200 applications including 70 “first-to-file”.
Figure 15: Merged entity Late Stage Pipeline. (Actavis, 2014)
In addition, being the first option for prescriptions is a key competitive advantage. It means that a 
brand is the most preferred one for physicians to prescribe. The combined entity benefited from this 
ability developed by Allergan as it had tight ties with physicians and insurance companies. 
Actavis and its financial advisors expected the transaction to generate double-digit accretion of the 
non-GAAP EPS within first 12 months after the deal closure. This deemed to be relevant for the 
acquirer, despite the fact that EPS accretion is not an indicator of value creation. (Bob Haas, 2013) 
Actavis expected $1.8 billion in operating and financial synergies to be realised within a year. On top 
of this, Allergan started last year its “Project Endurance” which lead to a $475 million in savings. 
This project was a transformation effort to keep pace in the dynamic pharmaceutical market. It 
tackled nearly all steps in the value chain and it was designed and implemented in six months. Allergan 
would cut activities delivering low ROI and reduce its employees by 13%. Finally, due to the 
acquisition, Actavis expected to generate $8 billion in excess cash flow to de-lever its balance sheet.
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4. Deal process: the steps in the merger decision
4.1 Valeant’s offer and the activist shareholder
During 2014, Allergan Inc. was the target of a hostile takeover bid by Valeant Pharmaceutical 
International Inc. with the collaboration of an activist shareholder, Bill Ackman, founder and CEO 
of the hedge fund called Pershing Square.
Back in 2012, J. Michael Pearson, Valeant’s CEO, spoke to David Pyott, Allergan’s CEO, about the 
possibility of combining the two companies. Two weeks later, after discussing the matter with its 
board, Pyott told Pearson they were not interested. Under Pearson’s leadership, Valeant continued 
engaging in highly leveraged mergers and acquisitions. After each deal, Pearson would cut costs to 
the minimum (particularly in R&D, a characteristic of the Growth Pharma, business model embraced 
by Valeant) to extract higher profits (SEC, 2014).
During 2013, Pershing Square hired William F. Doyle, a former Johnson & Johnson executive as 
senior advisor. On January 14, 2014, during the annual healthcare conference organised by JPMorgan, 
Doyle and Pearson, who knew each other from McKinsey days, held a meeting to discuss about 
possible joint M&A ventures. The meeting went well and they decided to meet again three weeks 
later for further discussions (Crow, 2015). 
In this meeting, Pearson and Doyle exchanged public information about Valeant and Pershing Square 
and discussed about Valeant’s financial position and business model. Moreover, they talked about 
how could Valeant structure its future transactions. Pearson and Ackman agreed that Valeant would 
identify a target and disclose it confidentially to Pershing Square, for the latter to decide whether it 
would be interested in participating. If Pershing Square was not interested, it would not purchase any 
shares in the target. Otherwise, Pershing Square would conduct an independent due diligence on the 
target, confirm its interest in working with Valeant and develop a strategy for the equity purchase. 
Around the same time, Pearson and Pyott agreed to meet to follow up on their September 2012 
discussion regarding a potential merge of the two entities. However, Valeant had already decided it 
would make a hostile takeover on Allergan. To do so, Pearson agreed with Ackman that Pershing 
Square would acquire first 5% of Allergan’s equity. Just before reaching the 5% ownership by 11 
April 2014, Pershing Square needed to get Valeant’s greenlight to keep acquiring Allergan’s shares. 
As for Schedule 13 D, anyone holding over 5% of a publicly listed company was required to file 
within 10 days a SEC report disclosing it. After the SEC filing, Pershing Square began a rapid 
accumulation program until it reached 9.7% of Allergan’s outstanding common stock, which 
happened by 21 April 2014. That day, both Pershing Square and Valeant filed a Schedule 13D with 
the SEC disclosing their positions in Allergan. The stake was broken down into 24.8 million shares 
underlying call options with exercise dates from March 2015 to April 2015. Moreover, they purchased 
forward contracts to have additional exposure to 3.45 million shares of Allergan’s common stock. 
Even though Valeant did not have any share itself, the operation was conducted via a Pershing 
Square’s fund called “PS Fund 1, LLC” contributed by Valeant with $76 million. (SEC, 2014)
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On April 22, 2014, once the 9.7% stake was built in Allergan, Valeant’s board made a public proposal 
to Pyott to acquire Allergan: $48.3 in cash and 0.83 Valeant’s common shares for each share of 
Allergan’s common stock. Allergan shareholders would have received a substantial premium over the 
unaffected price of $116.63 and would own 43% of the combined entity. Pyott and its team reviewed 
the proposal and, fifteen days later, rejected it.
4.2 Allergan refusal of the offer
Ackman started to put pressure on Allergan’s board from his position as largest shareholder. For 
instance, Ackman claimed that Pyott was in conflict of interest as he was fearing to lose his leadership 
position if Valeant’s proposal was accepted. Allergan’s board heard Ackman’s complaints but ended 
up dismissing them.
On May 27, 2014, Allergan filed a presentation with the SEC, in which it criticised Valeant’s business 
model and management team. Allergan’s concerns were Valeant’s: low organic sales growth driven 
mainly by price increases, intense and unsustainable acquisition activity, low R&D investments and 
its consequences for future growth, market share erosion due to the lack of sales and marketing 
infrastructure, and lack of transparency in financial report, as well as, the sustainability of its tax 
structure. Since Valeant’s takeover offer included an important amount of consideration in Valeant 
equity, Allergan was entitled to care and pose its concerns about Valeant’s intrinsic value and business 
model.
Allergan also presented the findings of independent consultants and forensic accountants (Alvarez 
& Marsal and FTI Consulting) based on publicly available information.
4.3 The White Knight
Brendon Saunders was Actavis’ CEO. He took his first position as CEO in 2010 (Bausch & Lomb). 
By 2014 he had already run three major pharmaceutical companies and sold two of them, resulting 
in a total deal value of $25 billion. The following graph shows 2010-2014 M&A activities related with 
Saunders leadership (Herper, 2015). 
Figure 16: Saunders' M&A activity since 2010. (Factset Research System & Company filings, 2014)
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Brenton Saunders was a PricewaterhouseCoopers partner focused on regulatory compliance in health 
care. Back in 2003, he met Fred Hassan, a pharmaceutical turnaround specialist. Both worked 
together in the turnaround of Schering, a pharmaceutical company accused of kickbacks, dangerous 
manufacturing and illegal marketing. It was a success and Saunders became its Chief Compliance 
Officer, negotiating hundreds of millions of dollars in settlements with the regulators. In 2007, 
Hassan choose Sanders to lead the integration of Schering’s new biotech acquisition for $14 billion. 
Throughout the process, Sander’s learnt Hassan’s deal making style: create your own team, eliminate 
middle management, find the right products, and communicate your strategy clearly to help 
employees, journalists and investors understand it. Two years later, Schering was sold to Merck for 
$41 billion, Hassan moved to become a partner at a Private Equity firm (Warburg Pincus) and 
Saunders stayed to manage the integration with Merck.
Once the integration process had finished, Hassan offered Saunders to become CEO of Bausch & 
Lomb; one of the largest suppliers of eye health products including contact lenses, lens care products, 
etc. Warburg Pincus had recently bought the company with the aim to turnaround its situation. The 
company was struggling after having received accusations on its products causing dangerous eye 
infections. Saunders accepted the position. He replaced two-thirds of the managers and made a series 
of acquisitions to add 34 new products to the company’s portfolio. In two years, sales grew at a YoY 
of 9% and EBITDA at 17%. 
After the successful turnaround, Warburg Pincus was considering an IPO, but there was another 
offer for Bausch & Lomb: Valeant wanted to buy the company. Finally, Bausch & Lomb was sold to 
Valeant and Pearson implemented its Growth Pharma strategy to the company cutting SG&A from 
40% to 20%.
Due to his experience working with a private equity firm, Saunders was hired as CEO of Forest 
Laboratories when Icahn, another private equity firm, bought an 11% stake in the company. Forest 
Laboratories was an American pharmaceutical company known for licensing European drugs for sale 
in the US. Three months later, during the annual JPMorgan Healthcare conference in San Francisco, 
Saunders met Paul Bisaro, CEO of Actavis. That’s when talks about a potential merger of the two 
companies started. Two months later, Actavis bought Forest for $28 billion, yielding more than $600 
million to Icahn. Then, Bisaro offered Saunders the CEO position of the combined company. 
After ten days being officially appointed the new CEO of Actavis, on July 11, 2014, Saunders asked 
the board of directors for permission to start talking to David Pyott, CEO of Allergan, who was 
trying to fight back Valeant’s hostile takeover. On July 30, Saunders called Pyott and offered him an 
alternative deal that would allow Allergan escape from the potential cost cutting program of Valeant’s 
hostile takeover. Saunders and Pearson had very similar understanding of the pharma industry and 
they were both very relevant players on this new trend called Growth Pharma. However, Saunders 
managed to convince Pyott that he would not cut R&D expenditure and that Allergan’s business 
model would remain largely intact. After a few months, Saunders and Pyott agreed on a final offer of 
$67 billion to acquire Allergan. The offer was far too high for Valeant and Pershing Square to be able 
to match it and the deal was closed. 
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4.4 Evolution of deal terms
The first non-binding proposal offered by Saunders took place on August 6, 2014: $175 per share in 
cash. It was above Valeant’s offer worth $170.21: $72 in cash and the rest resulting from the exchange 
of 0.83 Valeant’ shares per each of Allergan’s ones. Saunders’ first offer was still not enough for 
Allergan’s management, who demanded at least $180 per share. 
Negotiations between Allergan and Actavis were arduous with several back and forth offers and 
Valeant’s background threat of a potential hostile takeover. Moreover, in the meanwhile, Allergan 
was fined by the SEC with a $15 million penalty for failing to disclose merger talks with Actavis. 
Negotiations continued and Actavis gradually increased the total amount of its consideration, while 
giving a higher stake in the form of stock consideration. 
4.5 Final agreement
On November 14, 2014, Saunders called Pyott to propose an offer from Actavis, subject to 
negotiation of mutually satisfactory acquisition agreement and approval by both companies’ board. 
Saunders proposed a combination of $129.22 in cash and 0.3683 of Actavis’ share for each Allergan 
share. The implied value of the consideration, based on the Actavis’ share price that day, was of $219 
per share. 
Actavis board met in Ireland on November 15, 2014 to review the terms and conditions of the 
transaction. Among others, JPMorgan representatives, Actavis senior management and rating 
agencies participated in the meetings. Actavis would maintain the investment grade credit rating upon 
completion of the transaction. They also reviewed the proposed bridge facility, the results of the due 
diligence and the potential timeline to closing as well as the communication plan. Finally, JPMorgan 
presented a financial analysis of the combined entity and concluded that the proposed merger 
consideration was fair from a financial point of view.
Allergan’s board met on November 16 to review the terms and conditions. Among others, Goldman 
Sachs and Bank of America Merril Lynch representatives participated in the meetings to review the 
financial aspects of the final consideration. They discussed the reasonableness of the termination fees 
and the potential conflict of interests disclosed by Allergan’s financial advisors. Finally, they 
elaborated a presentation expressing that the merger consideration was fair from a financial point of 
view. 
After four months of tough negotiations, the night of November 16, 2014 the merger agreement was 
finally closed. On November 17, before the opening of US financial markets, a joint press note was 
released announcing the transaction. 
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5. Company valuation
In this chapter, we assess what was the fair value of Allergan Inc. for Actavis Plc at the time of the 
acquisition. The analysis includes different valuation methodologies: 
 Market and research
 Standalone valuation
 Discounted cash flow
 Control valuation
5.1 Market and Research
Historical Trading Range
One approach to obtain the standalone valuation of a company is to consider market’s view as 
reflected in the company’s share price. Typically, analysists look for the unaffected price taking 
different prices before the day of the announcement: one day, one week and four weeks before the 
deal’s announcement. However, since the market was already aware of a potential M&A operation 
almost 1 year beforehand (because of Valeant’s prior bid), a longer time horizon is considered. For 
Allergan, historical trading quotes, as stated in JPMorgan broker report, were the following:
 Price 8 Oct 2014 (unaffected): $190.5
 52 weeks - high: $190.72
 52 weeks - low: $88.34
Brokers’ Price Target
Allergan, as an important player in the sector, was covered by numerous research analysts. On 8th 
November 2014, JPMorgan published a buy-side survey concerning Allergan. JPMorgan conducted 
a buy-side survey from 2nd – 7th October 2014 of 171 investors, who followed the pharmaceutical 
industry. 19% of respondents agreed on a standalone valuation for Allergan of $160-$170 per share, 
while 70% stated a range between $150-$200 ($180 average).
Figure 17: Range of standalone valuations for Allergan. (JPMorgan, 2014)
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As for a potential acquisition price, responses pointed to a tighter range: 70% answered that a price 
in the range $190-$220 per share ($208 average) would be accepted.
Figure 18: Price sufficient for Allergan to be acquired. (JPMorgan, 2014)
After the announcement of the deal, on 31st December 2014, JPMorgan published a broker report 
which set a target price of $210. In the DCF valuation, JPMorgan obtained an Allergan stock value 
of $200. It also claimed that Valeant’s unsolicited offer had brought numerous potential strategic 
options for the future of Allergan. Therefore, the $10 gap between their DCF and the target price 
reflected the value-enhancing strategic options for Allergan to be acquired.
5.2 Standalone Valuation Methods
Trading multiples
Standalone valuation aims to assess the value of the target company in its present condition as an 
independent entity. Therefore, it does not consider any synergies for the buyer. It relies on actual 
Allergan’s status quo.
Peer’s analysis is a commonly used approach to obtain a standalone valuation of a company. This 
approach aims to value a company’s share based upon how companies that are similar and 
comparable are currently priced in the market.
The first task is to design different peer groups. Companies within one peer group should belong to 
the same industry and have similar features (such as size, business lines etc.). Moreover, they must be 
publicly traded, so as for stock price information to be available. Allergan’s peer group is defined as 
follows:
 Industry: Pharmaceutical and Biotechnologies companies
 Geographies: Multinational companies with sales distributed across different countries.
 Segment: Traditional Pharma and Growth Pharma companies.
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The following table provides a summary of the key figures for the peer group. The source of the data 
is the RV (“Relative Valuation”) tool of Bloomberg Terminal®. For the purposes of this analysis, we 
calculated implied enterprise values for each of the selected companies by multiplying its closing 
share price as of 14th November 2014 by the number of the company’s fully diluted shares (using the 
treasury stock method) based on information contained in most recent public figures and added to 
the result the company’s net debt.
When using multiples valuation, the main trade-off is that the more peers you use, the less variance 
you have, but the less similar are the companies.
Name Country Stock market Currency Nb of Shares (M) Mkt Cap Net Debt EV EBITDA TTM EBITDA FY1 EPS TTM EPS FY1
Valeant Pharmaceuticals CA NYSE USD 333 51504 17942 69446 1816 5003 0.9 12.9
Forest Laboratories Inc US NYSE USD 273 26987 -323 26664 422 1798 1.3 3.6
Shire PLC UK LSE GBP 302 25693 -1352 24342 1316 3858 3.2 5.9
UCB SA BRU XBRU EUR 194 14566 2455 17021 624 1500 0.6 4.7
Actelion Ltd CH VTX CHF 108 13071 -666 12404 588 870 4.5 7.4
Endo International PLC US NASDAQ USD 152 10308 3268 13576 NA 1444 2.8 5.4
Cubist Pharmaceuticals LLC US NASDAQ USD 76 5549 239 5788 70 252 1.3 1.5
Meda AB SE OTCPK SEK 348 4875 1867 6741 502 934 0.4 0.9
Orion Oyj FI NASDAQ OMX EUR 141 4819 53 4872 379 366 1.8 1.6
Ipsen SA FR EURONEXT EUR 101 4244 -137 4106 294 458 1.7 3.1
M (USD) USD
Table 8: Allergan's peer group. (Bloomberg, 2014)
Source: Bloomberg and annual reports.
Date: 14th November 2014
TTM: Trailing twelve months
FY1: Fiscal Year 2015
Price to Earnings (P/E) Ratio
The price to earnings ratio is used to value a company by measuring its current share price relative to 
its earnings per-share.
Usually, a company showing a high P/E, relative to its peers, signifies that investors expect higher-
than-peers’ earnings growth in the near future. Consistently, a low P/E ratio could imply that a 
company might be currently undervalued or that the market believes it has no foreseeable growth 
opportunities.
As for the Earnings-per-share (EPS) value, two different ratios are computed based on: Trailing-
twelve-months EPS (TTM EPS) and the EPS forecast one-year ahead (EPS FY1).
Below, one can find a summary with the different multiple values obtained for the peer group. The 
sub-group excludes those companies whose multiple is an outlier (too high/low) or whose multiple 
is meaningless (negative earnings). 
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Name Share Price TTM EPS P/TTM E EPS FY1 P/E FY1
Shire PLC 85.1$ 3.2$ 26.5x 5.9$ 14.5x
Actelion Ltd 121.0$ 4.5$ 26.7x 7.4$ 16.4x
Endo International PLC 67.8$ 2.8$ 24.5x 5.4$ 12.7x
Cubist Pharmaceuticals LLC 73.0$ 1.3$ 55.1x 1.5$ 49.4x
Meda AB 14.0$ 0.4$ 38.6x 0.9$ 15.6x
Orion Oyj 34.2$ 1.8$ 18.8x 1.6$ 21.0x
Ipsen SA 42.0$ 1.7$ 24.1x 3.1$ 13.7x
Mean 30.6x 20.5x
Median 26.5x 15.6x
Table 9: Sub-group for P/E ratios. (Bloomberg, 2014)
When applying the peer’s multiple to Allergan TTM EPS, one can obtain an estimation of Allergan’s 
value per share. Hence, for a TTM EPS of $6.3 (from Bloomberg 17th November 2014), the implied 
value per share would be either $165.6 using the peer group Median P/E or $191.3 using the Mean 
P/E. Moreover, actual P/ TTM E ratio for Allergan is 47x which means that markets expect higher 
future growth for Allergan than for its peers.
Allergan Inc
TTM EPS $6.3
x Median P/E 26.5x
Value per share  $165.6 
When applying the peer’s multiple to Allergan EPS FY1, one can obtain an estimation of Allergan’s 
value per share. Therefore, for an EPS FY1 of $8.7 (from Bloomberg 17th November 2014), the 
implied value per share would be either $135.8 using the peer group Median P/E or $177.9 using the 
Mean P/E. Additionally, actual P/EPS FY1 for Allergan is 24.4x. This figure deviates less from the 
Mean than Allergan’s P/TTM E ratio. Therefore, the market expects a slowdown in the future growth 
for the following year. 
Allergan Inc Allergan Inc
EPS FY1 $8.7 EPS FY1 $8.7
x Median P/E 15.6x x Mean P/E 20.5x
Value per share  $135.8 Value per share  $177.9 
Finally, it is important to highlight the fact that P/E ratios in the pharmaceutical industry tend to be 
higher than market’s average. Much of the industry’s costs are R&D investments. Usually, these are 
expensed immediately impacting the EPS figure on that year. In other words, pharmaceutical 
companies incur the costs of developing new drugs before the drug itself starts to produce revenues. 
Hence, the market interprets that there are always future growth opportunities derived from current 
P&L figures.
Allergan Inc
TTM EPS $6.3
x Mean P/E 30.6x
Value per share  $191.3
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Enterprise Value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) Ratio
The EV/EBITDA ratio is another ratio used to determine the value of a company. It considers the 
company’s debt which is neglected by P/E ratios. Still it studies the company as a standalone entity, 
without considering a control premium or the synergies that the target might bring to the merged 
entity.
The EV/EBITDA ratio is particularly interesting for transnational comparisons, as it ignores the 
effect of different taxation policies except for a debt tax shield. Additionally, since EV includes equity 
and debt, it gives a better overview of the target than P/E ratios.
Below, one can find a summary with the different multiple values that have been obtained for the 
peer group. The sub-group excludes those companies whose multiple is an outlier (too high/low) or 
whose multiple is meaningless (negative earnings).
Name EV (M) TTM EBITDA EV / TTM EBITDA EBITDA FY1 EV / EBITDA FY1
Valeant Pharmaceuticals 69446 1816 38.2x 5003 13.9x
Forest Laboratories Inc 26664 422 63.1x 1798 14.8x
Shire PLC 24342 1316 18.5x 3858 6.3x
UBC SA 17021 624 27.3x 1500 11.4x
Actelion Ltd 12404 588 21.1x 870 14.3x
Meda AB 6741 502 13.4x 934 7.2x
Orion Oyj 4872 379 12.9x 366 13.3x
Ipsen SA 4106 294 14.0x 458 9.0x
Mean 26.1x 11.3x
Median 19.8x 12.3x
Table 10: Sub-group for EV/EBITDA ratios. (Bloomberg, 2014)
Applying these multiples to Allergan’s TTM EBITDA (from Bloomberg 17th November 2014) gives 
an estimation of the company’s enterprise value. Hence, for an EBITDA of $2064M the implied 
value per share would be either $130.3 using the Median EV/EBITDA or $173.7 using the Mean 
EV/EBITDA. Actavis pays a higher EV/EBITDA multiple because it expects to compensate this 
fact with synergies. Additionally, the actual EV/EBITDA for Allergan of 29.5x means that the 
company could be slightly overvalued in comparison with its peers.
Allergan Inc Allergan Inc
TTM EBITDA (M USD) 2064 TTM EBITDA (M USD) 2064
x Median EV/EBITDA 19.8x x Mean EV/EBITDA 26.1x
Implied EV 40881 Implied EV 53798
- Net Debt -2041 - Net Debt -2041
Implied Equity Value 38840 Implied Equity Value 51757
/ Number of shares 298 / Number of shares 298
Value per share
 
$130.3 Value per share
 
$173.7 
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When applying the peer’s multiple to Allergan EBITDA FY1, one can obtain an estimation of 
Allergan’s value per share. Therefore, for an EBITDA FY1 of $3483 (from Bloomberg 17th 
November 2014), the implied value per share would be either $137.3 using the peer group Median 
EV/EBITDA or $124.8 using the Mean EV/EBITDA. The fact that Actavis pays a higher-than-
peers’ multiple means that it expects higher earnings growth for Allergan than for its peer group. 
Moreover, the EV/EBITDA FY1 for Allergan of 16.1x means that the company still is slightly 
overvalued.
Allergan Inc Allergan Inc
EBITDA FY1 3483 EBITDA FY1 3483
x Median EV/EBITDA 12.33x x Mean EV/EBITDA 11.26x
Implied EV 42945 Implied EV 39232
- Net Debt -2041 - Net Debt -2041
Implied Equity Value 40904 Implied Equity Value 37191
/ Number of shares 298 / Number of shares 298
Value per share  $137.3 Value per share  $124.8 
Different Ratios’ Pros and Cons
Price to earnings pros
The multiple is easy to understand and to compute. Moreover, since amortisation impacts net income, 
it accounts for differences in the capital intensity among companies. Finally, it focuses on the post-
tax line of the P&L and hence, it accounts for differences between tax rates. 
Price to earnings cons
Some of the multiples are computed by using EPS forecasts. These forecasts are made by equity 
research analysts, which may adjust their computations in different ways. For instance, the 
categorisation of items according to whether they are non-recurrent or core business leaves room for 
discretion. Therefore, using the average of different market consensus might pollute results, 
undermining the accuracy of the multiple. Additionally, this problem arises for every single company 
multiplying exponentially the concern.
Another issue with EPS is the number of shares outstanding. For instance, a company performing a 
shares’ buyback program decreases its number of shares outstanding, hence increasing its EPS. 
Consequently, the growth in EPS might not be accompanied by an improvement in performance. 
This might thus be misinterpreted by the market and affect P/E ratio values.
Enterprise value to EBITDA pros
Since EBITDA comes before depreciation and amortisation, it is not biased by the depreciation 
policy of a firm allowing a better comparability across companies. Moreover, EBITDA is considered 
to be a better proxy of cash flow generation than profit. Furthermore, it is easy to correct for non-
core assets or one-off events than the net income since the EBITDA comes before in the P&L. 
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Enterprise value to EBITDA cons
There is no single definition for Enterprise Value since there are many items that might be considered 
sometimes as “debt-like” or “asset-like” but the criteria are not always consistent. Moreover, it 
requires harder computations than the PE ratio and it does not consider the tax-differences between 
companies. For some companies, it might not be useful since it does not account for the capital 
intensity of the business as Depreciation & Amortisation is not reflected.
5.3 Discounted Cash-Flow Analysis (DCF)
Another valuation methodology is the Discounted Cash-Flow analysis. It aims to assess the intrinsic 
Enterprise Value of a company based on its ability to generate Free Cash Flows. These cash flows 
are discounted at a rate accounting for the riskiness of the cash flows. There are two cases, one values 
Allergan as a standalone company and the other includes synergies expected for Actavis. Both cases 
are equal except for the synergy module.
Cost of Capital
The cost of capital is defined as the “opportunity cost of all capital invested in the company”. It is a 
key element of the DCF analysis because it is the rate used to discount all the future cash flows:
 
Weighted average cost of capital =
ND
E + ND * (1 - Tax rate) * Kd + EE + ND * Ke
To compute the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), the following methodology is used:
1. Compute the amount of equity and debt the company uses in its capital structure. To do so, 
the market value of the equity and the book value of the net debt are used:
a. Equity value
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐷𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
The number of shares at the deal announcement date was 300,238,000 and the 
unaffected share price of October 2014 is $190.5.
Therefore, the market capitalisation is $57,195,339,000 (E).
b. Net debt value
From the annual report of Allergan 2014, the total financial debt accounts for 
$2,157,400,000. Allergan’s Cash and cash equivalent position is $4,911,400,000. 
Therefore, Net Debt is computed as Debt minus Cash and cash equivalent, it is       
$-2,754,000,000 (ND).
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2. Compute the cost of each kind of source of capital the company uses: equity and debt in this 
case.
a. Cost of equity. Equity shareholders face an opportunity cost of investing in a specific 
company instead of using the same capital for a different project. Typically, CAPM 
(Capital Asset Pricing Model) is used to compute the cost of equity.
Cost of equity = risk free +  β * market risk premium
In this case, since Allergan is an American company, the “risk free” can be assumed 
to be equal to the US treasury long-term rate posted on the announcement date 
which is 2.21%.
Unlevered  is taken from Damodaran Database which computes it for the 𝛽𝑈
Pharmaceutical industry 2014. Levered  is computed considering Allergan’s 𝛽𝐿
capital structure with the following formula:
𝛽𝐿 = 𝐵𝑈 ∗ (1 + (1 ‒ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ Net DebtEquity )
0.88𝛽𝐿 = 0.91 ∗ (1 + (1 ‒ 0.26) ∗ ( ‒ 0.05)) =  
The market risk premium obtained from historical data is 4.24%.
Therefore, the cost of equity is 5.93% (Ke) = 2.21% + 0.88*4.24%.
b. Cost of debt. Analysts assume the cost of debt equal to the implied interest rate derived 
from the P&L’s interest expenses and the company’s debt in the Balance Sheet. This 
is later adjusted by the tax rate, to account for the tax-deductibility benefit of interest 
expenses.
Moody’s rating for Allergan’s debt was A3 which is quite strong and reflects the 
company’s strong niche market position. Allergan provides its cost of debt pre-tax 
in their 10-k SEC filling which is 3.49% (Kd). 
3. Finally, components are weighted as the formula below shows. To adjust the post-tax cost 
of debt, a tax rate of 26% is considered which is consistent with Allergan’s annual report 
data.
WACC =
ND
E + ND * (1 - Tax rate) * Kd + EE + ND * Ke =  5.36%
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Stand-alone DCF
Free Cash Flows
After-tax free cash flow is defined as the after-tax cash flow that would be generated by operating 
assets if the company had no debt and cash. It is computed as follows:
Free Cash Flow = EBIT * (1 - Tax rate) + De
 preciation -  Change in working capital -  Capital expenditures 
So as for the Free Cash Flows input, this research paper is based on JPMorgan estimates presented 
in its Oct’14 Broker report. The report includes estimates for the next five fiscal years: 2014E, 2015E, 
2016E, 2017E and 2018E (expected).
% change in sales -39% -8% 1% 3% 10%
FORECASTS
( $ million ) 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E 2017 E 2018 E
EBIT (1-t) 1642 2373 2844 3012 3163
D&A 262 276 286 315 330
CAPEX 196 200 200 200 200
Change in net working capital -307 -75 5 25 50
FCF 2015 2524 2925 3102 3243
PV FCF 1913 2274 2501 2517 2498
Business Plan
Table 11: Stand-alone DCF output. (JPMorgan, 2014)
Since it considers year-end figures, the discount factor for year n is:
DFn =
1(1 + WACC)n
DF1 = 0.95 DF2 = 0.9 DF3 = 0.86 DF4 = 0.81 DF5 = 0.77
Terminal Value
The Terminal value of the DCF computation allows to reflect returns that will occur so far in the 
future that they are nearly impossible to forecast on a per-item basis. There are two different 
approaches to compute terminal value: either based on the capital employed or based on the last-
period free cash flow of the forecast period. The first method is commonly used in industries such 
as mining where analysts estimate a liquidation value by adding the residual value of land, buildings, 
equipment less the cost of restoring the place. However, since Allergan is not expected to be 
liquidated in the long run, the latter option, based on Terminal Value is used.
The normalised free cash flow is computed by multiplying the 2018E free cash flow by one plus the 
long-term growth rate selected for Allergan. To compute the terminal value, a perpetuity is assumed 
over this normalised free cash flow and then it is discounted to present value. The growth rate 
suggested by JPMorgan for the company’s main competitors falls between -1% and 0% given the 
mature franchises. 
𝐹𝐶𝐹Normative = 𝐹𝐶𝐹2018E ∗ (1 + 𝑔) = 3243 ∗ (1 + 0%) = 3243M USD
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The analysis below assumes a 0% growth rate for Allergan aiming to obtain a conservative result. 
Still, we also run a sensitivity analysis to different growth and WACC rate. 
TV =
𝐹𝐶𝐹Normative(WACC -  g) =  3243(5.36% -  0%) = 60492.8 M USD
With the considerations detailed above, the present value (TV * DF5) of the TV is 46590.6 M USD. 
All figures except share price (USD) and Nb of shares (Million) are in Million USD.
Summary
EV = PV FCFs + PV TV 58292.6
Net Debt -2754.0
Equity Value 61046.6
Nb of shares 300.2
Share price 203.3$
Additionally, the output of the DCF model yields a standalone value per share of $203.3 for Allergan.
Sensitivity Analysis
One of the main concerns on a DCF valuation is that it heavily relies on assumptions over two 
parameters: the perpetual growth rate and the weighted-average cost of capital. Hence, it is important 
to carry out a sensitivity analysis. When running it over Allergan’s valuation, the share price ranges 
between [$180.2 – $234].
203.33$ 4.9% 5.4% 5.9% 6.4% 6.9% 7.4%
-0.5% 206.9$ 189.4$ 174.7$ 162.1$ 151.3$ 141.8$
-0.3% 215.0$ 196.0$ 180.2$ 166.8$ 155.2$ 145.2$
0.0% 224.0$ 203.3$ 186.2$ 171.8$ 159.5$ 148.8$
0.3% 234.0$ 211.3$ 192.7$ 177.2$ 164.0$ 152.7$
0.5% 245.1$ 220.1$ 199.9$ 183.1$ 168.9$ 156.9$
0.8% 257.5$ 229.9$ 207.7$ 189.5$ 174.3$ 161.3$
G
ro
w
th
WACCShare price sensitivity
Table 12: Stand-alone DCF sensitivity analysis
Synergies DCF
The methodology for the DCF with synergies is equal to that of the standalone version.
Free Cash Flows
Free cash flows are computed as the standalone free cash flows plus synergies expected on due time. 
Operating and Tax synergies estimation comes from a JPMorgan broker report. As discussed before, 
Allergan benefits from Actavis’s Tax Regime. Therefore, Tax Synergies account for 70% of total 
synergies in the long-term. Operating Synergies represent the fact that Allergan can leverage Actavis’ 
scale and scope.
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% sales 4% 3% 3% 3% 3%
FORECASTS
( $ million ) 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E 2017 E 2018 E
Operating Synergies 0 800 1150 1400 200
Tax Synergies 0 497 445 509 534
Business Plan
Table 13:Expected synergies. (JPMorgan, 2014)
% change in sales -39% -8% 1% 14% 55%
FORECASTS
( $ million ) 2014 E 2015 E 2016 E 2017 E 2018 E
EBIT (1-t) 1642 3333 4024 4206 3350
D&A 262 276 286 292 295
CAPEX 196 200 200 200 200
Change in net working capital -307 -75 5 25 50
FCF 2015 3484 4105 4273 3394
Business Plan
Table 14:Synergies DCF output. (JPMorgan, 2014)
Terminal Value
The new Terminal Value uses new Free Cash Flows with synergies. All the rest being equal, FCF 
normative is:
𝐹𝐶𝐹Normative = 𝐹𝐶𝐹2018E ∗ (1 + 𝑔) = 3394 ∗ (1 + 0%) = 3394M USD
TV =
𝐹𝐶𝐹Normative(WACC -  g) =  3394(5.36% -  0%) = 63308.9 M USD
With the considerations detailed above, the present value (TV * DF5) of the TV is 48759.5 M USD. 
All figures except share price (USD) and Nb of shares (Million) are in Million USD.
Summary
EV = PV FCFs + PV TV 63401.5
Net Debt -2754.0
Equity Value 66155.5
Nb of shares 300.2
Share price 220.3$
Additionally, the output of the DCF model yields a standalone value per share of $220.3 for Allergan.
Sensitivity Analysis
One of the main concerns on a DCF valuation is that it heavily relies on assumptions over two 
parameters: the perpetual growth rate and the weighted-average cost of capital. Therefore, it is 
relevant to carry out a sensitivity analysis. When running it over Allergan’s valuation, the share price 
ranges between [$196 – $252.5].
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220.34$ 4.9% 5.4% 5.9% 6.4% 6.9% 7.4%
-0.5% 224.2$ 205.7$ 190.2$ 177.0$ 165.5$ 155.5$
-0.3% 232.7$ 212.7$ 196.0$ 181.8$ 169.6$ 159.0$
0.0% 242.1$ 220.3$ 202.3$ 187.1$ 174.1$ 162.8$
0.3% 252.5$ 228.7$ 209.1$ 192.8$ 178.9$ 166.9$
0.5% 264.1$ 237.9$ 216.6$ 198.9$ 184.0$ 171.3$
0.8% 277.2$ 248.2$ 224.8$ 205.6$ 189.6$ 176.0$
G
ro
w
th
Share price sensitivity WACC
Table 15: Synergies DCF sensitivity analysis
5.4 Control Valuation Methodologies
Control Valuation Methodologies take into account the “Control Premium”. The Transaction 
Multiples Methodology compares multiples paid in comparable precedent transactions, in our case 
those selected by JPMorgan and Bank of America (BOFA). Comparability is assessed in the following 
way: first, companies are chosen based on similar financial and operational characteristics, including 
belonging to the pharmaceutical industry. Second, the size of the transactions should be similar to 
that of Actavis & Allergan. Third, the type of transaction and characteristics of the buyer also should 
be comparable. Fourth, those transactions which occurred recently tend to be more meaningful.
Transactions Multiples
Announcement Date Target Acquiror Transaction Value (Million USD) EBITDA (Million USD) TV/EBITDA
August 24, 2014 InterMune Inc. Roche Holdings Inc. 8300 -207.5 NA
February 18, 2014 Forest Laboratories, Inc. Actavis 25000 418.3 59.8x
August 26, 2013 OnyxPharmaceuticals, Inc. Amgen Inc. 10400 -141 NA
May 27, 2013 Bausch & Lomb Incorporated Valeant 8700 720 12.1x
September 3, 2012 Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation Valeant 2600 200 13.0x
May 2, 2011 Cephalon, Inc. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. 6800 721 9.4x
February 16, 2011 Genzyme Corporation Sanofi-Aventis 20100 1100 18.3x
January 3, 2010 Alcon, Inc. Novartis AG 12900 680 19.0x
March 12, 2009 Genentech, Inc. Roche Holdings, Inc. 46800 3250 14.4x
October 16, 2008 ImClone Systems Incorporated Eli Lilly and Company 6500 200 32.5x
April 10, 2008 MillenniumPharmaceuticals,Inc. TakedaAmericaHoldings,Inc. 8800 64 137.5x
April 23, 2007 MedImmune, Inc. AstraZeneca PLC 15200 -144 NA
March 11, 2007 Organon BioSciences N.V. Schering-Plough Corp. 14400 860 16.7x
Mean 33.3x
Median 17.5x
Comparable Transactions
Table 16: Precedent transactions selected by JPMorgan and BOFA. (Bloomberg, 2014)
Note: TV: Transaction Value paid by the acquirer in Million USD
          EBITDA from Annual Report of targets for acquisition’s year in Million USD.
The median transaction TV/EBITDA is 17.5x. Using the TTM EBITDA at announcement provided 
by Bloomberg, it implies an Allergan’ share price of $129.6. On the other hand, the mean multiple 
value is 33.3x, implying an Allergan’ share price of $237.9.
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Allergan Inc
TTM EBITDA 2064
x Mean TV/EBITDA 33.3x
Implied TV 68663
- Net Debt -2754
Implied Equity Value 71417
/Number of shares 300.2
Value per share  $237.9 
Conclusions
A football field is typically used to show the results of different valuation methodologies at once. 
EV/EBITDA and P/E multiple’s results suggest a valuation in the low-range of the football field, 
partially explained because they do not account for the expected synergies and the control premium. 
DCF Standalone seems to indicate that Allergan might be more valuable than its peers, as its result 
stands above the standalone multiple valuation. When taking into account synergies, DCF yields a 
valuation in the high-range of the football field. Finally, Precedent transactions’ multiple shows a 
wide-range, with no clear trend to be noted.
On the 14th of November, the two parties agreed on the deal terms which implied, by that time, a 
consideration of $219 (cash: $129 and 0.3683 Actavis shares) per each of Allergan’s shares. A bridge 
financing was provided by JPMorgan, Mizuho and Wells Fargo to support the total transaction value. 
Moreover, the deal financing consisted of a combination of existing cash, new debt, new equity and 
equity-linked securities (Actavis, 2014):
 $27.5 billion of new debt issued 
 $28 billion of new equity issued to Allergan shareholders
 $9 billion of new equity and mandatory convertible preferred issued to the market
 Upsized existing revolver to $1 billion 
Allergan Inc
TTM EBITDA 2064
x Median TV/EBITDA 17.5x
Implied TV 36137
- Net Debt -2754
Implied Equity Value 38891
/Number of shares 300.2
Value per share  $129.6 
$50 $100 $150 $200 $250
Price to Earnings
EV to EBITDA
Precedent transactions
DCF  Stand-alone
DCF with Synergies
Value per share ($)
Figure 19: Allergan's football field
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Regarding new capital structure, key figures are:
 $45 billion total debt
 420 million fully diluted shares
 15% effective tax rate for the merged entity
Actavis expected a strong cash flow generation for the merged entity and this would help to de-
leverage the balance sheet in the future. Particularly, the leverage is expected to be below 3.5x within 
12 months.
Based on the discussed analysis, the final deal price belonged to the high-range. The question naturally 
falling next is: Did Actavis overpay for Allergan’s shares, as the numbers above seem to suggest?
As a starting point for the discussion, one must note that the fact that Actavis paid beyond the 
amount suggested by the valuation analysis does not necessarily imply that it overpaid.
On one hand, the circumstances surrounding the deal negotiation process significantly affected the 
deal final price. In the case of Actavis-Allergan’s merger, one of the particularities was Valeant’s 
hostile takeover running in parallel. Because of Actavis’ determination to close the deal, the company 
needed to come up with an offer such that Valeant and Pershing Square could not exceed. Allergan’s 
management also seemed to push Actavis to play the winner’s course (effect which tends to make 
the winner overpay in an auction) as they did not want Valeant to succeed. Moreover, Actavis had 
significant strategic interest in Allergan. Organic growth was difficult to achieve given the big 
challenges the industry was facing in 2014. Hence, Actavis’ management preferred to opt for 
inorganic growth through a M&A operation. Among the big players, Allergan seemed the best fit for 
Actavis, it complemented Actavis’ successful generic franchise with Allergan’s patented blockbusters 
(i.e., BOTOX®). All these reasons seem to support the idea that Actavis had room to increase the 
offer price beyond what the valuation numbers showed, while still ensuring value creation to its 
shareholders.
On the other hand, one can also find literature suggesting that M&A overpayment exists and is 
particularly large for mega-deals and contested deals. A BCG report holds that mega-deals destroy 
nearly twice as much value relative to smaller transactions (The Boston Consulting Group, 2007). 
Moreover, it also seems to be the case that over-confident management, management who 
overestimates their ability to realise synergies, tend to bid for larger targets (Roll, 1986; Hayward and 
Habrick, 1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Finally, according to Harford and Li (2007), CEOs might 
support larger deals disregarding the price paid because they generally provide high private benefits 
for the management. (G. Alexandridis, 2011)
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6. What happened?
6.1 EPS analysis based on post-merger figures
The present analysis aims to assess whether the merger was effectively accretive by looking at pre 
and post-merger EPS figures. The section compares two different time periods. The first period, 
from 2010 to 2014, looks at the standalone EPS of Actavis and Allergan. The second period 
corresponds to 2015 and 2016 and considers the combined entity’s EPS.
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Figure 20: Adjusted EPS for Actavis, Allergan and the Combined Entity
Actavis had a higher EPS than Allergan consistently from 2010 to 2014. The difference between both 
metrics actually increased overtime.
Regarding the second period, from 2015 to 2016, the combined entity EPS experienced a downward 
trend. Even though the deal was EPS accretive in its first year, it was not in the following. At first 
glance, it seems counterintuitive for a deal to be accretive at first and then dilutive. However, there 
was an external reason that pushed EPS on the merger first year: the company sold one part of its 
generic business to Teva for $15 Billion after tax. 
Moreover, when comparing the figures with the ones on JPMorgan’s report, the results seem quite 
disappointing for Actavis’ shareholders. Estimations for 2016 assumed 11% EPS accretion for 
Actavis shareholders and, as noted above, the combined entity did not manage to deliver that EPS 
as Figure 21 shows.
Accretion 2016 E 2017 E
ACT EPS 18.39$ 20.37$
New Co EPS 20.49$ 23.7
Accretion 2.10$ 3.35$
% above ACT standalone 11% 16%
Figure 21: Accretion/Dilution analysis. (JPMorgan, 2014)
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6.2 Post-merger Peer Analysis
This subsection will cover the comparison of the post-merger evolution of Allergan PLC (the merged 
entity name) and its peers, both in terms of share price and multiple comparable evolution.
Allergan’s performance is compared to three different peer groups, each one of them accounting for 
the there different R&D models outlined in chapter 7.1, which are based on Allergan’s mapping of 
the industry (Allergan PLC, 2015): group A (Traditional), group B (Open Science) and group C (Low-
Cost).
Group A: Traditional
Peer Headquarters Logo
GlaxoSmithKline PLC Brentford, London,United Kingdom
Merck & Co., Inc. Kenilworth, New Jersey, United States
Novartis AG Basel, Switzerland
Pfizer Inc. New York City, United States
Roche Holding AG Basel, Switzerland
Sanofi Gentilly, France
Table 17: Peer group A (Traditional)
Group B: Open Science
Peer Headquarters Logo
Biogen Inc. Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States
Celgene Corp. Summit, New Jersey, United States
Shire PLC Dublin, Ireland
Table 18: Peer group B (Open Science)
Group C: Low-Cost
Peer Headquarters Logo
Endo International PLC Dublin, Ireland
Mallinckrodt PLC Surrey, United Kingdom
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Mylan N.V. Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, 
United States
Teva Petah Tikva, Israel
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Inc. Laval, Quebec, Canada
Table 19: Peer group C (Low-cost)
Share prices vary widely from company to company. Hence, the right approach to enable 
comparability among peers is to analyse the relative change in share price (% change) with respect to 
the same start date. The chosen reference or start date selected is 20th March 2015, the day after 
Allergan and Actavis merger concluded.
Peer Group A (Traditional) - Share Price Evolution 
Figure 22: Peer group A - Share price evolution
Figure 27 shows how Allergan had seen its share price increase over 1200% in less than 8 years (2007-
14), outperforming growth figures for the Top 10 Big Pharma Companies (all of them belonging to 
the Traditional Group, except for Teva). This exponential growth, propelled by Actavis continuous 
M&A policy, enabled the company to qualify for this top-notch group by 2015, after Actavis-Allergan 
merger had been concluded. 
However, Allergan’s post-merger performance relative to its peer shows a picture considerably 
different to that of the pre-merger period. On the first-year post-merger, Allergan’s performance 
remained paired to that of the overall group, which experimented a share price fall between a 10 to 
20%. After this first year, Allergan’s share price continues to fall heavily and beyond that of the 
average of the group. As of today, Allergan’s share price has decreased 20% on the whole period.
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Peer Group B (Open Science) - Share Price Evolution
Figure 23: Peer group B - Share price evolution
Peer Group B is composed of Biogen Inc., Shire PLC and Celgene Corp., companies which are 
considered to have a comparable business model to that of Allergan, the so called “Open Science” 
R&D approach. Within this group, one observes larger disparity and overall worst performance 
compared to that of Group A (Traditional Pharma). Celgene Corp. is the best performer in the group 
followed by Shire PLC, Allergan and finally, Biogen Inc.
Peer Group C (Low-Cost) - Share Price Evolution
Figure 24: Peer group C - Share price evolution
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Peer Group C corresponds to the “Low-Cost” players within the Pharmaceutical industry. According 
to Allergan’s classification, this group is composed by those companies which invest a very low 
percentage of their Sales in R&D and mainly source their pipeline externally through acquisitions. 
Looking at share price evolution, one can conclude that this group has been the one mostly hit by 
market expectations in the past two years. Among the worst performers: Valeant and Endo, which 
have seen their share price decrease more than 80% over the past two years. Within the group, 
Allergan is the one showing better performance with an accumulated 25% decrease in value. 
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Section III: Deep dive into Growth Pharma
7. Growth pharma vs traditional pharma
7.1 1990s to 2000s: The emergence of a new R&D Approach: Growth 
Pharma
On its article “Why pharma megamergers work”, McKinsey classifies megamerger deals into two 
broad types: Consolidation and Growth-oriented deals. 
As explained in the article, throughout the mid to late 1990s, consolidation deals were the most 
popular. They involved the consolidation of existing players which owned businesses with significant 
overlaps. In this way, the deals aimed to create meaningful economic profit for acquirers through 
both accelerated revenue growth and cost synergies (e.g. reduction on overhead costs, COGS 
improvement, R&D rationalization and consolidation etc.). Pfizer’s acquisition of Warner-Lambert 
or Roche’s acquisition of Genentech stand as an example of these type of consolidation deals.
On the other side, as of 2000, growth-oriented megamergers started to become more common. These 
deals were aimed to become a growth platform for the acquiring company by expanding drug 
pipelines, or enabling an entry into new geographies or new markets. Contrary to Consolidation deals, 
most of the economic benefit of growth deals came from trading-multiple expansion, rather than 
changes in fundamental operating performance due to the lack of business overlap. 
Building on these M&A trend, a new Pharma Business Model emerged called Growth Pharma. Growth 
Pharma diverged from existing Traditional Pharma companies in their R&D business model.
Traditional Pharma companies (such as Pfizer, Novartis or Roche) continued to bet on R&D 
expenditure and in-house innovation as its main engine to foster growth. Hence, they were relying 
on M&A activity to a much lesser extent targeting companies for specific strategic purposes.
On the other hand, Growth Pharma companies grew their drug pipeline inorganically by means of 
continuous acquisitions. To some extent, their approach seemed closer to that of a Deal-making 
company specialized in the Pharmaceutical industry rather than that of a Pharmaceutical company. 
Valeant or Allergan are two of the most well-known exponents of the Growth Pharma model. Despite 
both being highly M&A-intensive and relatively adverse to R&D, they still show differences in the 
intensity of their approach. Whereas Valeant opted for a more aggressive model cutting costs to the 
absolute bone, Allergan maintained R&D expenditure to fuel a certain level of organic growth 
capabilities (Bloomberg, 2016).
All in all, this new R&D disruptive strategies led to a new mapping of the pharmaceutical industry. 
At an Investor Press event (Allergan PLC, 2015), Allergan illustrated their view of the market with 
the following market map. As discussed above, “Open Science” and “Low Cost” models would 
belong to the two different approaches take by Growth-Pharma companies.
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Figure 25: Pharmaceutical companies’ classification according to R&D sales and % externalised pipeline (Allergan PLC, 
2015)
7.2 2000s till 2015: Market’s enthusiasm with Growth Pharma 
Throughout the 2000 and 2010s, the overall market reaction on Growth Pharma firms was initially 
extremely positive. Allergan and Valeant, both exponents of the Growth Pharma model, saw their stock 
price increase more than 800% in less than eight years. When compared to the performance of the 
Top 10 Big Pharma companies (all of them positioned as Traditional Pharma companies, except for 
Teva), these results seem even more striking. Over the same period, all Top 10 Big Pharma companies 
experienced an overall share price increase below 100%. 
Figure 26: Allergan and Valeant vs. Top 10 pharmaceutical companies - Share price evolution (Kurmann Partners, 
2015)
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It seemed like Growth Pharma players were managing to deliver substantial shareholder return solely 
through “serial M&A” (Kurmann Partners, 2015).
Figure 27: Allergan-Actavis vs Valeant - Share price evolution (Kurmann Partners, 2015)
7.3 2015 till today: Raising concerns. The fall of Valeant, is Allergan next? 
Concerns on an overall Pharma Bubble
As shown by IMAP 2016 Industry Report (IMAP, 2016), a long-term analysis of EBITDA multiples 
for pharmaceutical transactions shows a recent strong increase in valuations, particularly for larger 
deals (>$2.5 billion). These trend starts to raise a question on the potential existence of a Pharma 
Bubble. 
Looking closer to the sample’s deals, once notices that this increase in valuations has mainly been 
driven by Growth Pharma deals. TEVA’s acquisition of RIMSA, a Mexican branded generics 
provider, (10x revenues) or Baxalta’s acquisition of Sigma Tau’s oncology division (9x revenues), 
serve as examples of these transactions. (IMAP, 2016)
Figure 28: Pharmaceutical EV/EBITDA multiples (IMAP, 2016)
52
Growth Pharma model particularly hit by the market
The possibility of a Growth Pharma Bubble is what may now be driving market expectations down. As 
noted in chapter 6.2 peer analysis, since 2014 the pharmaceutical industry has experienced an overall 
decrease in share prices. This fall has been particularly pronounced for Growth Pharma companies, 
experiencing an average cumulative 50% decrease since April, 2015. Particularly “Low-Cost Pharma” 
firms (such as, Valeant, Endo and Mylan), have seen their valuations fall due to their deteriorating 
financials and/or drug pricing scrutiny. 
Figure 29: Endo, Mylan and Valeant's P/E ratio. (Bloomberg, 2016) 
The most re-known Growth Pharma crash: The fall of Valeant
During 2008 to 2015, under Michael Pearson CEO leadership, Valeant Pharmaceutical became a 
serial acquirer, doing more than 100 M&A transactions. (The New Yorker, 2016) Valeant focused on 
external growth through the acquisition of what it called “mispriced” assets, that is, companies whose 
value could “easily” be increased by: increasing its drug prices, benefiting from Valeant’s low tax rate 
regime and finally, by cost cutting. On the other hand, the company invested almost nothing in the 
organic growth of its core business. Valeant R&D spending stood at 3% of its sales in 2016, far from 
the 13.4% average of the industry (EvaluatePharma, 2016). 
Moreover, it was very extreme with bringing up drug prices. According to an analysis of 2014 to 2015 
changes in drug prices, Valeant's average price hike per drug was of 75.6%. Over the same period, 
the company’s biggest price increase was of 608% for Cuprimine, a drug treating Wilson’s disease. 
(Bloomberg, 2016) 
The company also engaged in accounting and financial engineering. In 2010, Valeant merged with 
the Canadian company Biovail for the sole purpose of lowering its tax rate. It continued to pursue 
tax benefits by sheltering its intellectual property in tax havens like Luxembourg. Valeant also used 
opaque accounting methods to hinder analysts’ and investors’ judgement on the effectiveness of its 
own performance and that of its acquisitions.
This aggressive strategy summed up with a public pressure over Valeant’s price hikes, ended up by 
impacting the company’s stock price. Since July 27, 2015, Valeant’s latest all-time high record of 
257.53 $/share, the company has seen its share price decrease dramatically with a cumulative 2900% 
drop and reaching a single digit share price of 8.51 $/share as of April 21, 2017.
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Figure 30: Valeant share price. (Yahoo Finance,2017)
Should one expect the same for Allergan? How do both firms compare
Bloomberg’s report “How Allergan rose and Valeant fell” (Bloomberg, 2016) seems to shed some 
light on the reasons behind the similar starts, but potential different outcomes for both companies. 
So, how do both firms compare?
As shown by the figures below, Valeant has taken by far a more extreme approach on its business. 
Valeant has engaged in fewer large deals than Allergan. Most of the transactions targeted small 
companies complying with the company’s “mispriced asset” criteria previously described. This has 
enabled the company to pay for overall lower multiples. On the other hand, Allergan has gone for 
higher premiums for bigger and arguably higher quality assets. From 2010-15, Valeant closed 50 deals 
worth $35 billion, paying a median of 3x revenue. Throughout the same period, Allergan invested 
$105 billion on just 22 deals, paying a median of 6x revenue. (Bloomberg, 2016)
Moreover, both companies have been involved in tax inversion deals in its aim to exploit tax benefits 
from lower-tax structure countries. Biovail-Valeant merger in 2010 enabled the company to move its 
operations to Canada, a low-tax regime country, resulting in the company’s current 10-15% corporate 
tax rate. As for Allergan, its deal with Actavis (the report’s case study) granted the merged entity 
access to Ireland’s low-tax regime, with the company’s 2016 tax rate forecasted at 14%.
Despite both betting on external growth, Allergan continued to invest to some extent in R&D and 
internal drug discovery. In 2015, R&D as share of sales stood at 16% for Allergan, below the 20-25% 
range for Traditional Pharma firms, but still above the industry average of 13.4% in 2016. 
(EvaluatePharma, 2016) On the other hand, Valeant’s spending considerably lagged at an industry-
bottom 3% of sales.
Regarding drug pricing, both companies have benefited from questionable price hiking practices. 
Nevertheless, Allergan has not been as aggressive as Valeant. According to an analysis of 2014 to 
2015 changes in drug prices, Valeant's average price hike per drug was of 75.6% compared to an 
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8.47% for Allergan. Over the same period, Valeant’s biggest price increase was of 608% for 
Cuprimine, whereas for Allergan it was of 185% for a topical skin cream. (Bloomberg, 2016)
Figure 31: Valeant vs Allergan comparison. R&D, target’s revenue multiple and tax rate (Bloomberg, 2016)
Figure 32: Valeant vs Allergan price comparison (Bloomberg, 2016)
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Despite the noted differences in approach, Allergan is also suffering from falling 
market expectations
Since July 27, 2015, Allergan’s latest all-time high record (331.15 $/Share), the company has seen its 
share price decrease reaching an overall 40% drop as of April 21, 2017(236.35 $/share). 
Figure 33: Allergan stock price. (Yahoo Finance, 2017)
Tying in with the facts described throughout the chapter, the following factors seem to explain 
Allergan’s decreasing share price evolution. 
Market concerns on a potential Pharmaceutical Bubble are pushing down valuations for 
pharmaceutical companies, as noted in previous peer group 2014-17 share price evolution graphs. 
Moreover, the collapse of Pfizer’s $160 billion merger with Allergan also impacted negatively on 
Allergan’s stock price. The deal termination on April 6, 2016 came after a US tax rule change aimed 
to curb tax inversion deals, which was the merger’s main rationale with the combined entity 
domiciling in Ireland (Allergan’s incorporation country). 
Allergan’ share price particularly suffered from Valeant fall due to their similarities as Growth Pharma 
exponents. Growth Pharma’s practice of regularly increasing prices for drugs and marketing new drugs 
with exorbitant prices is now being strongly criticized by public attention. New governmental policies 
are also expected to be issued to stop pricing abuses placing additional pressure on Allergan sales and 
margins’ perspectives. 
With current Growth Pharma model under question, Allergan has already shown signs to dissociate 
from this now apparently unfavourable label. In September, 2017, Allergan released a note to 
investors on its new “Company’s Social Contract With Patients”: the company compromised to keep 
price increases on its drugs to less than 10% a year and to moderate pricing generally.
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So, is Allergan going to be the next crash or the proven formula for Growth 
Pharma?
All in all, it is still not clear whether Allergan will be the next Growth Pharma failure case or it will 
manage to stand firm as the proven formula for this model. Finding the right balance to external and 
internal growth will likely be the key to resolve this uncertainty.  
For the moment, market’s view on Allergan is still positive. Analyst still expect healthy growth from 
Allergan over the next few years. Bloomberg consensus figures point at a 6.5% revenue CAGR for 
2016-19, far above that of other Traditional Pharma companies such as Novartis (4%) or Sanofi (2%). 
(Bloomberg, 2016) 
Moreover, Bloomberg’s report also points at a large undervaluation of Allergan stock price. As of 
December 30, 2016, analyst consensus would estimate a fair share price of $260, while Allergan would 
be trading at around $195.  
Figure 35: Allergan stock - Actual share price vs consensus 12 month price target (Bloomberg, 2016)
Figure 34: Pharmaceutical companies - revenue CAGR (Bloomberg, 2016)
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8. Conclusions
The pharmaceutical industry has showed strong M&A activity in recent years. A decline in R&D 
productivity, a complex regulatory environment, margin erosion by pricing pressures and a growing 
demand for generic drugs have been the industry’s main drivers for this trend. As a response to this 
challenging environment, big pharmaceutical companies found in M&A a way to: access new branded 
products, expand into international markets, reach new therapeutic categories and gain economies of 
scale.
Brent Saunders, Actavis’s CEO, played a key-role in changing industry-dynamics as an M&A 
catalyser. With markets rewarding companies engaging in M&A activities, Saunders bided big and 
succeed. Its proven track record of successfully integrated acquisitions allowed him to confidently 
merge Actavis and Allergan, two multi-billion-dollar companies, while granting the merged entity 
access to the Top 10 players by Enterprise Value. The company’s main reasons to pursue this 
acquisition were: to get access to Allergan’s blockbuster franchises, to benefit from tax synergies by 
integrating Allergan’s operations into Actavis lower tax regime and to reach +100 countries to 
diversify its revenue source. Within one year, the new entity was expecting to benefit from $1.8 billion 
in operating and financial synergies, excluding additional revenues or manufacturing synergies. 
Moreover, tax synergies were obtained as Actavis P&L effectively moved from a 26% to a 15% tax 
rate.
Despite Actavis-Allergan merge was finally announced in November 17, 2014, Allergan faced a 
hostile takeover sooner that year by another important player of the industry: Valeant. To do so, 
Valeant partnered with Pershing Square, a New York based Hedge Fund. Together, they built a stake 
in Allergan’s stock and acted as an activist shareholder to convince Allergan’s board of directors to 
sell Allergan to Valeant. However, they refused as they did not believe that Valeant was the best 
future owner for Allergan. Finally, after months of back and forth, Actavis’s CEO closed a deal to 
acquire Allergan for $66 billion.
Based on a JPMorgan estimates (JPMorgan, 2014), a deal valuation analysis was undertaken to 
compare the actual transaction consideration effectively paid by Actavis with the expected value 
created by the merger. The DCF analysis (including synergies) yields a central value per Allergan’s 
stock of $220.3 which almost matches the $219 per share final offer that Allergan accepted. 
Moreover, precedent transaction multiples show that similar figures were paid in comparable 
transactions: deals closed for multinational pharmaceutical companies with more than 5 billion 
dollars in Enterprise Value over the last 10 years. Even though EV/EBITDA and P/E ratios yielded 
a valuation in the lower range, between $130 and $173, Allergan had intangibles such as brand-
awareness and a strong R&D know-how which supported a higher valuation. JPMorgan buy-side 
survey also provided a standalone valuation between $150-$200. Furthermore, when asked for a price 
acceptable for Allergan considering synergies, buy-side pool yielded a price between $190 and $220.
When looking at the company post-merger figures, the deal results were not as positive as expected. 
JPMorgan pre-merger valuation estimated a first-year 11% 2016 EPS accretion for Actavis 
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shareholders. However, the combined entity did not manage to deliver that figure and eventually 
resulted dilutive at a -3%.
All in all, Actavis-Allergan merge stands as a first-class example of Growth Pharma, the new business 
model which disrupted the pharmaceutical industry introducing a new approach on how to pursue 
R&D and build drug development pipelines. Growth Pharma companies were relatively averse to R&D 
expenditure and in-house new drug discovery. On the contrary, they sought to expand drug portfolios 
inorganically by means of continuous acquisitions of other companies with promising “mid-to-late 
development stage” and already successful “in-the-market” drugs.
Growth Pharma emerged in the early 2000s with Valeant and Allergan as its most-renown exponents. 
It shined through the 2000s and early 2010s delivering skyrocketing returns to its investors. Allergan 
and Valeant investors saw their share price increase more than 800% in less than eight years, while 
same figures were below 100% for the other Top 10 Big Pharma companies. However, market’s 
enthusiasm seems to have sharply cooled down since 2015.
Public backlash against the aggressive drug price hike practices or the extensive abuse of financial 
and accounting engineering are some of the reasons behind the now pejorative shed over the Growth 
Pharma label.  Moreover, the model itself starts to show its inevitable limits. As noted in The New 
Yorker article “The Roll-Up Racket” (The New Yorker, 2016), some of these players have become 
roll-ups: companies that buy lots of other companies, trusting that they will be worth much more 
together than apart. However, the big challenge for roll-ups is obvious: «you need to keep feeding 
the beast: if you grow by buying, you have to keep buying to thrive.» (The New Yorker, 2016) 
However, the bigger and famous you get, the higher the premiums demanded by the sellers and the 
fewer the deals left that can truly boost your returns.  
Valeant is already a fallen angel. The question now is whether Allergan will follow or it will manage 
to stand firm as the proven formula for the Growth Pharma model. Finding the right balance between 
organic and inorganic growth will likely be the key to resolve this uncertainty. 
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